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People prefer to receive good outcomes immediately rather than wait, and they must be compensated for
waiting. But what influences their decision about how much compensation is required for a given wait?
To give a partial answer to this question, we develop the DRIFT model, a heuristic description of how
framing influences intertemporal choice. We describe 4 experiments showing the implications of this
model. In the experiments, we vary how the difference between a smaller sooner outcome and a larger
later outcome is framed—either as total interest earned, as an interest rate, or as total amount earned (the
conventional frame in studies of intertemporal choice)—and whether the larger later outcome is
described as resulting from the investment of the smaller sooner one. These alternate frames have several
effects. First, the investment language increases patience. Second, the explicit provision of the (otherwise
implicit) experimental interest rate sharply reduces the magnitude effect. Correspondingly, we find that
interest frames increase patience when the rewards are small, but they decrease patience when they are
large. Third, the interest-rate frame induces somewhat greater discounting for longer time periods and,
thus, reverses the common finding of “hyperbolic” discounting. Thus, many of the “stylized facts”
implied by studies involving choices between a smaller sooner and a larger later amount are eliminated
or reverse under alternate outcome frames.
Keywords: intertemporal choice, delay discounting, framing, choice modelling
Any interesting choice involves tradeoffs. For intertemporal
choices, the tradeoffs involve time and amount—smaller sooner
rewards compared with against larger later rewards. For some, the
perfect real world example may be the decision of whether to
endure lower (or no) wages during college so as to permit greater
earnings later.
The dominant method for investigating intertemporal choices in
the lab has been to elicit choices between smaller-sooner and
larger-later amounts of money (see, e.g., Ainslie & Haendel, 1983;
Hardisty & Weber, 2009; Kirby, 1997; Read, 2001; Sayman &
Öncu¨ler, 2009; Weber et al., 2007; Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, &
Bettmann, 2009). Most of this research has focused on how dis-
count rates are influenced by differences in the magnitude or
timing of those outcomes (e.g., Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989;
Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Scholten &
Read, 2006; Thaler, 1981). A second research stream has focused
on how these choices correlate with other individual differences,
such as smoking behavior (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003;
Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, & Taubinsky, 2008) or demo-
graphic characteristics (Frederick, 2005). A third focus is on the
influence of ephemeral states, such as whether participants have
been aroused by viewing women in bikinis (Van den Bergh,
Dewitte, & Warlop, 2008) or by the sight or scent of freshly baked
cookies (Li, 2008).
The present article falls into a fourth stream of research that
examines whether, and how, discounting is affected by the de-
scription of options. For example, Magen, Dweck, and Gross
(2008) found that respondents are markedly more patient if the
choice between “receiving $100 now” and “receiving $140 in one
year” is recast as “receiving $100 now and receiving nothing in
one year” versus “receiving nothing now and $140 in one year.”
Read, Frederick, Orsel, and Rahman (2005) found that outcomes
are discounted much less when the time to them is referenced by
the date of their occurrence (e.g., “on June 3, 2012”) than the
intervening interval (e.g., in 15 weeks). Similarly, for choices
involving longer horizons, Frederick, Read, LeBouef, and Bartels
(2011) found less discounting when references to the future were
made in terms of the age the respondent will be at that time (e.g.,
“when you are 45”) than in terms of the number of the correspond-
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ing number of years. Such framing effects provide clues about how
options are mentally represented, and about why that affects pref-
erences.
In a typical study of intertemporal choice, choices are framed as
being between a Smaller, Sooner (SS) option and a Larger, Later
(LL) option.1 In one widely used measure, for instance (Kirby,
Petry, & Bickel, 1999), subjects choose between pairs such as “$80
now [SS] OR $85 in 157 days [LL].” We call this standard frame
the Amount frame. Most psychological models of discounting are
based primarily on data derived from this frame (e.g., Killeen,
2009; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Scholten & Read, 2006, 2010).
The experiments conducted in this article vary the framing of
outcomes. We compare variants of the Amount frame with two
others, which we call the Interest-rate and Interest-total frames.
We also develop the DRIFT model, which treats intertemporal
choices as drawing on processes common to other multi-attribute
choices. The attributes we focus on are those familiar from earlier
accounts of time discounting, including absolute differences be-
tween outcomes, proportional differences, interest rates, and the
broader context of consumption and investment. The studies show
systematic effects that are predicted, or readily accommodated, by
the DRIFT model. Before presenting any psychology, however, we
first describe the economic theory of intertemporal choice, and we
discuss some preference patterns that appear anomalous with re-
spect to it.
Economic Theory and Its Anomalies
To provide a background for our empirical work, we begin with
some formal language and a small amount of normative theory. As
noted, nearly all experimental work involves what we call the
standard Amount framed task, in which respondents choose be-
tween Smaller Sooner (SS) and Larger Later (LL) amounts of
money, say, between $100 now or $110 in 1 year. We denote the
sooner amount as xS which is received at time tS and the later
amount as xL received at time tL. Thus, SS  (xS, tS), and LL 
(xL, tL). The later amount xL can be understood as the outcome
from investing xS at an experimental interest rate, iE, over the
interval separating the two outcomes. In our example:
xL xs1 iEtLts or $110 $100 1 .110.
The experimental interest rate, in this case 10%, is chosen by the
experimenter. The decision maker evaluates the options drawing
on their own personal interest rate, denoted i. Economic theory
predicts that decision makers will prefer LL over SS only if the
experimenter offers a return on investment greater than this inter-
est rate (see Cubitt & Read, 2007). That is, preferences will follow
the following inequality, with LL preferred if the right hand side is
greater:
iE  i
In our example, a decision maker with a personal interest rate of
20% would take SS, whereas one with a rate of 5% would take LL.
Thus far, the economic and psychological models coincide. In
economic theory, however, the personal interest rate is not arbi-
trary, but determined by each individual’s lending and borrowing
opportunities in credit markets. Everybody has an opportunity cost
for money built up from his or her current “financial portfolio,”
which can include credit card bills, savings accounts, mattresses,
and investments. If Mary is currently saving money at 3% per year,
for example, then 3% per year is her opportunity cost for delaying
the receipt of money. If the experimenter offers Mary a 10%
return, she should therefore choose LL, since 10% is higher than
3%. On the other hand, if John has no savings and an unpaid
balance on his credit card costing 18%,2 he should take SS when
offered the same options, because, for him, money received now
used to reduce his debt will “earn” 18%. Thus, in theory, each
person’s personal interest rate i will equal iM, their opportunity
cost for capital (see Price, 1993, for a comprehensive account, and
Coller & Williams, 1999, for a discussion of this in the context of
experimental economics.).
Indeed, as first shown by Fisher (1907, 1930), economic theory
not only predicts that decision makers will act as if i is equal to
iM, but that the psychological rate of interest, meaning their “un-
derlying” degree of impatience or time preference, will actually
converge on their opportunity cost for money—this is why we
used the subscript  to denote the personal interest rate. To see
why, consider Mary. She will continue saving money until she
reaches a point at which the value of an extra $1.00 of immedi-
ate consumption is worth at least as much as an extra $1.03 of
consumption in 1 year. Consequently, if offered the opportunity to
take an extra dollar now, or invest it for 1 year at 3%, she will be
indifferent: Her underlying psychological interest rate, i, will
have come to match the economic rate of 3%. The same argument
applies to John, who will have borrowed as much as he wants at
18% and for whom i is also therefore 18%.3
If the above analysis fully described behavior, intertemporal
choices between dated monetary rewards would not interest psy-
chologists. Psychologists are interested, however, because the
economic analysis falls short even as a rough approximation of
intertemporal choice (for a review, see Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O’Donoghue, 2002). Perhaps the core anomaly is that the psycho-
logical interest rates inferred from people’s choices (we denote
1 In matching studies, the situation is much the same except that respon-
dents are asked to complete a missing smaller-sooner or larger-later
amount to make two options equivalent.
2 John should have no savings, since any savings will certainly be
earning less than 20%. We know, however, that many people simultane-
ously roll over credit card debt and keep savings earning much less than
that debt (Banks, Smith, & Wakefield, 2002; Gross & Souleles, 2002).
3 This should not be interpreted as implying that there are no individual
differences in time preference, but only that the economic model holds that
respondents who face the same market rate will have aligned their psy-
chological rates with that market rate before they arrive at the lab to make
their marginal choices. Imagine an “ant” and a “grasshopper” that each
earn $1,000 a month and can save at 3%. The ant is more patient than the
grasshopper and saves $900 every month, whereas the grasshopper saves
only $100. Now both come into the laboratory and are asked whether they
want to receive $1 now, or invest it at 3%. Both will be indifferent, because
the fact they are saving some of their income demonstrates they are already
consuming all they want given their respective incomes and the 3% interest
rate. Clearly, however, the ant is much more patient than the grasshopper.
According to the economic model, however, this will not be reflected in the
psychological interest rate, as it is measured by choices between delayed
amounts of money. This prediction is known as the Fisher separation
theorem (see Hirshleifer, 1958).
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them iˆ) deviate from market rates and almost always exceed them.
Overlaying this major anomaly are several others including two
that will be our primary focus: The magnitude effect (iˆ is lower
for larger amounts), and the delay effect (iˆ is lower for longer
delays). These departures have motivated descriptive theories of
intertemporal choice that depart radically from the normative the-
ory first outlined by Fisher (for examples, see Ainslie, 1975;
Killeen, 2009; Leland, 2002; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Rubin-
stein, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2006, 2010).
The DRIFT Model
We propose that the size, existence, and even direction of major
anomalies in intertemporal choice are strongly affected by option
framing, which serves to emphasize some features and mask
others. The features constitute arguments for and against each
option, with the strength of the arguments determined by both the
attractiveness of the feature value, and the attention paid to it. To
illustrate in an everyday context, your decision of whether to buy
a car with good gas mileage depends, in part, on how expensive
gas is and how much you drive, but also on how much attention
you pay to gas mileage at the moment of purchase (as well as how
much you think about other things, such as the greater safety
afforded by a heavier gas guzzling vehicle). Because different
frames allocate attention differently, different preferences can re-
sult.
In our experiments, the focal independent variables are varia-
tions in the framing of xL. Below, we specify some outcome
features that can receive differential attention in response to these
variations, along with how the different frames adopted in our
experiments relate to these features. This list does not cover every
possible relevant outcome feature, but it does include most of the
natural perspectives from which intertemporal tradeoffs of mone-
tary rewards can be viewed.
D(ifference): The absolute difference between the two out-
comes. In this case, the additional earnings xL  xS. We
propose that D receives greatest weight in the Amount frame
(and that major findings from intertemporal choice studies
partly result from its widespread adoption by researchers).
R(atio): The relative, or proportional, difference between the
two outcomes: (xL  xS)/xS. We propose that R receives
greatest weight in the Interest-total frame.
I(nterest): The experimental interest rate: iE. Feature I and R
differ for intervals other than 1 year. We propose that I
receives greatest weight in the Interest-rate frame.
F(inance): The degree to which the experimenter’s offer is
expressed as an opportunity to invest rather than consume.
This feature is enhanced by the Investment frame, which can
be applied to all of the other frames.
The DRIFT model summarizes the qualitative effect of these four
features (DRIF) on choice, with T representing time. The model
can be given the following compact summary:
WDDWRRWIIWFF WTT
According to the DRIFT model, decision makers balance a
weighted average of the four DRIF features, against the impor-
tance given to the time (T) to wait for the larger reward. If the left
hand side is greater (i.e., if the DRIF features outweigh T), then LL
is chosen; if not, then SS is chosen. We conceptualize the weights
Wi  0 as representing the attention paid to feature i. Since
attentional capacity is limited, attention allocated to one feature
reduces the weight accorded to other features; thus, combining
frames usually yields intermediate effects, as we shall later see.
For the current article, there is no need to distinguish between the
weight WF and the attribute value F. We include both to acknowl-
edge that, in principle, more or less attention can be paid to what
the money will be used for (WF), and the money can be considered
for either immediate consumption, or investment, or some combi-
nation of the two (F). It is generally important to recognize that the
impact of a given feature will be a function of the magnitude of
that feature, and its importance in decision making.
In contrast with most conventional discounting models, which
are alternative-based, DRIFT is attribute-based. In other words,
rather than discounting outcomes according to their temporal dis-
tance, temporal differences are set against magnitude differences.
From an attribute based perspective, many of the widely reported
anomalies in intertemporal choice (including the delay and mag-
nitude effect, upon which we focus) can be seen as following
directly from familiar psychophysical principles (for other
attribute-based approaches, see Killeen, 2009; Leland, 2002;
Rubinstein, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2010).
DRIFT is not proposed as a formal quantitative model, which
would go beyond our current goals and data. However, we can
indicate some modeling requirements for future research. In addi-
tion to indices of attention, the weights Wi would serve as “scaling
parameters.” All else equal, the smaller the unit of the feature, the
larger its weight, and the more features that are combined on the
same side of the equation, the smaller the weight of each. Further-
more, there are likely to be nonlinearities in the impact of the
model features. One basic nonlinearity is diminishing sensitivity,
which is that the marginal impact of an amount decreases with its
magnitude. We suspect that diminishing sensitivity will apply to
features D, R, and I.4 For instance, an increase in the interest rate
from 1% to 2% will have greater impact than one from 20% to
21%. Similarly, there would be nonlinearity in the definition of T.
While the DRIFT model with a linear T mimics some elements of
hyperbolic discounting (patience increasing with increases in de-
lay), a concave time-weighing function over delays (Scholten &
Read, 2010; Zauberman et al., 2009) would be needed to produce
time inconsistency, such that when both options are delayed by a
common period of time preferences for SS can reverse in favor of
LL. These modeling considerations are ignored in this article,
which focuses on the qualitative implications of outcome framing.
The DRIFT model extends earlier attribute-based approaches to
intertemporal choice by allowing for the consideration of multiple
perspectives on choice. To illustrate, if attention is paid only to D,
4 One modeling issue to be resolved is whether diminishing sensitivity
operates on outcomes or on model features. For instance, in the original
tradeoff model, diminishing sensitivity is applied to outcomes, that is,
v(xL)  v(xS), but, when applied to the D feature, we have v(D), where v
is a concave value function over increases.
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so that WR, and WI equal 0, it is equivalent to a rudimentary
version of Scholten and Read’s (2010) tradeoff model, while if
attention is paid only to R, so that WD and WI equal 0, it is a
similarly rudimentary version of the interval discounting model
(Scholten & Read, 2006). Finally, if attention is paid to both D and
R, it mimics the original statements of the tradeoff model and the
interval discounting model, in which both absolute and propor-
tional differences matter.
The DRIFT model predicts that the magnitude effect and the
delay effect arise from variations in the three DRI factors, and that
the size of both effects will reflect the weights Wi applied to those
factors. The magnitude effect occurs because multiplying two
amounts by a common constant (1) increases D, which shifts
preference toward LL. For example, if $100 and $110 are doubled
to $200 and $220, the difference between them will double from
$10 to $20. If decision makers pay any attention to D (i.e., if WD 
0), the DRIFT model predicts a magnitude effect. The size of that
effect, meaning how great an impact a given increase in D has on
preference, will depend on WD. As we expand on shortly, frames
that direct attention toward D will therefore show larger magnitude
effects than frames that draw attention toward other features.
The delay effect arises when attention is focused on R as well as
D. For a given interest rate, the strength of the arguments favoring
LL will grow faster than those favoring SS, because while time (T)
increases linearly, D increases exponentially. To illustrate this,
suppose iE is 10% and the decision maker is indifferent between
$100 now and $110 in 1 year. If iE is maintained and the discount-
ing interval is extended to 3 years, the choice will be between $100
now and $133 in 3 years. While the interval will have tripled, the
reward for waiting (D) will have more than tripled, as will the
proportional difference (R). Consequently, preferences can shift
toward LL.5
We propose that, relative to the Interest-rate and Interest-total
frames, the standard Amount frame leads to more attention being
allocated to D. This will lead to a strong magnitude effect and a
delay effect. Alternative frames draw attention to other features,
potentially changing preferences. The Interest-rate frame draws
extra attention to I, and the Interest-total frame draws attention to
R. To illustrate these effects, imagine an idealized frame which
shifts all attention to I (i.e., WD  WR  WF  0), producing the
following reduced version of the DRIFT model:
WII  WTT
Holding the interest rate constant, the left hand side would there-
fore remain unchanged when magnitudes are increased by a con-
stant proportion, so that with this idealized frame, the following
choices would be treated identically:
$100 now OR $121 in 2 years I  10% per year; R  21%]
$200 now OR $242 in 2 years I  10% per year; R  21%].
The magnitude effect would be eliminated. A similar argument
would hold if all the decision weight was placed on feature R.
Increasing outcomes by a common multiple will not change R,
and, therefore there will be no magnitude effect if attention is
exclusively focused on R. Thus, we predict the magnitude effect
will be reduced when frames highlight the interest rate (I), the
proportional difference (R), or both.
An additional consequence of putting all decision weight on
feature I is that the delay effect will be reversed. To see why,
consider what the reduced version of DRIFT predicts for the two
choices below:
$100 now OR $110 in 1 year I  10% per year; R  10%]
$100 now OR $133 in 3 years I  10% per year; R  33%].
Since I is held constant while T increases, the reduced DRIFT
model predicts a shift toward SS for longer time intervals—a
reversal of the traditional delay effect. This does not hold, how-
ever, if all weight is placed on R (or D). The relative (and absolute)
difference does increase with delay, and at a faster rate than delay.
Focusing exclusively on R or D, therefore, will produce a delay
effect.
The DRIFT model does not directly predict whether the level of
discounting will be higher or lower for different frames. However,
at least for decisions involving small amounts of money and short
delays, Coller and Williams (1999) have found evidence that
people are more patient when interest information is provided. In
our studies, we investigate a wide range of magnitudes, and we
predict that patience increases fastest under the standard Amount
frame. Correspondingly, we predict the Interest-rate frame will
induce greater patience for small values of xS and for short delays.
This difference will decrease and perhaps reverse as D increases,
as occurs with increases in amount (xS) and delay.
The DRIFT model also predicts that discounting will be reduced
when outcomes are characterized as investment rather than imme-
diate consumption opportunities, since this will increase the value
of feature F. We expect that under the standard frame, when
investment is not mentioned, people will be biased to treat earnings
as immediate consumption opportunities (see Read & Powell,
2002, for evidence of this bias),6 which corresponds to a low value
of F.
In the following experiments, we compare discounting under
Amount, Interest-rate, and Interest-total frames both with and
without investment framing. We begin with a brief overview.
Overview
We present four experiments, each conducted using a different
sample from the online panel of the Yale School of Management
Internet laboratory (eLab), an electronic survey website which
rewards participants with chances to win Amazon.com gift certif-
icates. eLab has approximately 20,000 participants, and it receives
about 4,000 unique visitors each month. Participants received a
5 The most common version of the hyperbolic discount function, in fact,
holds that the future value of xL needed to equate xS and xL will increase
linearly as a function of time. That is, indifference is maintained when
xL  xS(1  ktL) for some value of k (Mazur, 1987).
6 An implication of the questions commonly asked in studies of inter-
temporal choice is that respondents are making tradeoffs between short-
term increases in consumption and not in their income. For instance, many
studies involve preferences over small time scales, such as $10 today and
$15 in 2 weeks. This can only be considered a non-trivial choice if the
decision maker is assumed to plan to consume an extra $10 within the
following 2 weeks than they otherwise would. Under any other circum-
stances, the choice of $10 will be dominated by the $15.
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1/50 chance of a $50 Amazon.com gift certificate for their partic-
ipation. To help ensure that no respondent participated in more
than one study, all studies besides the first were advertised only to
those who had not previously participated (others neither saw the
advertisement nor had access to the link). Second, if there were
two completed surveys originating from the same URL, the second
entry was automatically excluded from the data.
Each study involved hypothetical choices between an SS option
(available now) and an LL option. The hypothetical nature of the
choices was not emphasized, although no respondent queried us on
this, as respondents were familiar with eLab conventions and were
informed explicitly how they were being compensated (the chance
of a certificate). In all studies, SS was immediate and involved
either a small ($700) or large ($70K) reward. Also in all studies,
LL was either 1, 3, or 10 years in the future. Although the precise
wording varied slightly between studies, and though Study 2 also
involved an investment framing, the approximate content of the
three basic frames was as follows:
Amount: Receive $100 now or an extra $33 in 3 years.
Interest-rate: Receive $100 now or an extra 10% interest per
year over 3 years [compounded annually].
Interest-total: Receive $100 now or an extra 33% after 3
years.
In all studies, we measured patience as the fraction of LL choices.
Excepting Experiment 1, respondents responded to questions by
clicking on buttons labeled either “Take the money now” or “Take
the money later.” Since Amount frames are so commonly used,
they can be viewed as the standard against which to compare the
results from other outcome frames. As noted in the foregoing
discussion, we predicted that the Interest-rate and Interest-total
frames would exhibit a smaller magnitude effect and a reduced or
even reversed delay effect (because I remains unchanged while T
increases), while the Amount and Interest-total frames would show
the standard delay effect (because D and R increase faster than T).
In addition, we predicted that patience would be increased when
the decisions were characterized as investments (because this will
increase F).
Finally, we anticipated that the Interest-rate frame would yield
more patience than the Amount frame for smaller amounts of
money and short intervals of time, but that this difference would
attenuate or even reverse for larger amounts and longer intervals,
as D is increasing in both magnitude and delay. Correspondingly,
we expected there to be some amount/delay combinations for
which the Amount frame would yield greater patience than the
Interest-rate frame.
Experiment 1
In this study, we used investment language for describing
choices and compared the standard Amount frame to the Interest-
rate frame. We hypothesized the Interest-rate frame would yield a
smaller magnitude effect (Hypothesis 1a [H1a]) and a reduced or
even reversed delay effect (Hypothesis 1b [H1b]). Furthermore,
based on earlier research, we predicted that at smaller magnitudes
(when xS  $700) the interest rate frame would show greater
patience than the Amount frame (Hypothesis 1c [H1c]), but that
this difference would be reduced for larger amounts (xS  $70K).
Method
Three hundred and ninety-five eLab members started the survey,
and 373 completed it. All analyses are conducted on the com-
pleters. Their mean age was 36 years (Mdn 34, SD 12.6); 64%
were female, and 52% had a bachelor’s degree or greater.
Each respondent answered 12 questions framed as investment
opportunities. We varied Magnitude (xS  $700 or $70K) and
Delay to LL (1 or 3 years). At each magnitude/delay combination,
we asked three questions corresponding to different experimental
interest rates (4%, 8%, and 16%). The dependent variable was the
proportion of LL choices (patience) at each delay/magnitude com-
bination.
Each respondent was assigned to one of four frames: either the
Interest-rate frame or one of three versions of the Amount frame,
which we call the Amount-combined, the Amount-incremental,
and the Amount-incremental plus “interest” conditions. An exam-
ple of each frame is given below:
Interest-rate: Would you rather receive $70,000 now or
invest it for 1 year at an 8% interest rate?
Amount-combined: Would you rather receive $70,000 now
or invest it for 1 year to earn $75,600 in total?
Amount-incremental: Would you rather receive $70,000
now or invest it for 1 year to earn $5,600?
Amount-incremental plus “interest”: Would you rather re-
ceive $70,000 now or invest it for 1 year to earn $5,600 in
interest?
After seeing each question, respondents clicked a button indicating
whether they would “Take the money now” or “Invest the money.”
Prior to answering the questions, respondents received the fol-
lowing instructions:
On each of the following pages, you will be faced with a choice
between an immediate payment and an investment opportunity. When
choosing, please consider the length of time the money will be
invested and the annual interest rate.
Keep the following in mind:
[For those in Interest-rate frame only.] The interest will be com-
pounded annually.
The investments are binding. If you choose to invest, the money will
not be available until after the investment period.
Results and Analyses
Summary. Table 1 presents the proportion of LL choices for
each condition, and Figure 1 shows the relationships between
Delay, Frame (collapsing over the three Amount conditions), and
Magnitude. Figure 2 shows mean patience in both conditions at
both magnitudes to highlight the magnitude effect. The main
results were as follows:
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1. The three Amount conditions show nearly identical re-
sults.
2. The magnitude effect was greater for the Amount frame
than the Interest-rate frame (H1a).
3. In the Interest-rate frame, respondents became less pa-
tient with longer delays, reversing the delay effect often
observed using amount frames (H1b).
4. The Interest-rate frame produced greater patience than
the Amount frame for smaller amounts but not for larger
ones (H1c).
Details. We first tested whether the three variants of the
Amount frame differed by conducting a three-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) excluding the Interest-rate frame: A 3 (Con-
dition: Combined, Incremental, Incremental plus “interest”) 	 2
(Magnitude: $700, $70K) 	 2 (Delay: 1, 3 years) ANOVA. No
term containing Condition approached significance (ps range from
.203 to .927), and the Magnitude-difference—the difference be-
tween the average patience in the $700 and $70K conditions—was
also virtually identical across conditions (between 33% and 34%).
For subsequent analyses, we pooled the three amount conditions,
and in later studies, we restrict our attention to the Amount-
incremental condition, which explicitly refers to D.
The next analysis was a 2 (Frame: Amount, Interest-rate) 	 2
(Magnitude) 	 2 (Delay) ANOVA. We obtained a highly signif-
icant main effect of Magnitude, F(1, 371)  191.4, p 
 .0001,
p
2  .34, reflecting more choices of LL when xS was $70K than
when it was $700. This effect was moderated by Frame—Frame 	
Magnitude interaction, F(1, 371)  25.9, p 
 .0001, p2  .065—
confirming the magnitude effect was greater in the Amount frame
(Magnitude-difference  34%) than in the Interest-rate frame
(16%), as highlighted in Figure 2 (H1a).
In support of H1b, a significant interaction was observed be-
tween Frame and Delay, F(1, 371)  16.2, p 
 .0001, p2  .042,
with patience decreasing with delay for the Amount frame (“hy-
perbolic discounting”), but increasing with delay for the Interest-
rate frame (“anti-hyperbolic discounting”). Separate ANOVAs for
the Amount and Interest-rate frames revealed that both effects
were significant. In the Amount frame, patience was greater for the
1-year delay than for the 3-year delay, F(1, 235)  7.4, p  .007,
Figure 1. Patience (choice of Larger, Later [LL] option) in Amount and Interest-rate conditions of Experiment
1 when xS  $700 and $70K. Numbers in bars indicate delays in years. Error bars indicate 1.96 standard errors
of the mean.
Table 1
Mean Percentage of Patient Choices (Larger, Later [LL] Option) in All Conditions of Experiment 1
Condition N
$700 $70K
1 year 3 years 1 year 3 years
Interest-rate 137 45 (36) 42 (36) 61 (37) 54 (37)
Amount-aggregate 77 23 (30) 24 (30) 52 (34) 60 (36)
Amount-incremental 76 22 (26) 28 (32) 55 (38) 63 (36)
Amount-incremental-interest 83 23 (36) 22 (31) 54 (36) 58 (38)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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p
2  .030; however, in the Interest-rate frame, it was greater for
the 1-year delay, F(1, 136)  8.9, p  .003, p2  .061.
In support of H1c, there was a significant effect of Frame, F(1,
371)  11.6, p 
 .001, p2  .030, with average patience greater
for the Interest-rate frame than the Amount frame. This effect was
almost entirely attributable to the small magnitude condition, as
suggested by the Frame 	 Magnitude interaction discussed earlier.
We tested this by conducting a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) comparing the Amount and Interest-rate frame at all
four Delay/Magnitude combinations, and then conducting pairwise
comparisons. The MANOVA was significant, F(4, 381)  14.04,
p 
 .001. The results of the pairwise comparisons are shown in
Table 2 (which also shows equivalent comparisons for Experi-
ments 2 and 3). When xS  $700, the Interest-rate condition
yielded significantly greater patience than the Amount condition at
both delays, but when xS  $70K, there was no difference between
the two frames. Indeed, there was a non-significant reversal at the
3-year delay. This is consistent with our suggestion that the greater
patience observed in the Interest-rate frame would reverse if the
value of D was sufficiently great. Since D increases with time (as
Figure 2. Magnitude effect in Amount and Interest-rate conditions of Experiment 1. Numbers in bars indicate
magnitude of xS. Error bars indicate 1.96 standard errors of the mean. LL  Larger, Later option.
Table 2
Comparison Between Patient Choices in Amount and Interest-Rate Frames in Experiments 1–3
Magnitude Delay (years) Patience-difference% SE F (dfs) P2
Experiment 1
$700 1 19.8 3.4 33.52 (1, 384) .080
3 14.9 3.4 18.75 (1, 384) .047
$70K 1 6.2 3.8 2.64 (1, 384) .007
3 6.2 3.8 2.66 (1, 384) .007
Experiment 2
$700 1 27.0 4.1 42.874 (1, 252) .145
3 22.3 4.0 31.181 (1, 252) .110
10 8.7 4.2 4.313 (1, 252) .017
$70K 1 1.0 4.3 0.059 (1, 252) .000
3 9.2 4.5 4.216 (1, 252) .016
10 14.7 4.5 10.613 (1, 252) .040
Experiment 3
$700 1 24.6 6.6 14.07 (1, 141) .091
3 8.7 6.1 2.01 (1, 141) .014
10 1.5 6.2 0.06 (1, 141) .000
$70K 1 2.4 5.6 0.18 (1, 141) .001
3 13.5 6.0 5.15 (1, 141) .035
10 20.0 6.1 10.68 (1, 141) .070
Note. Patience-difference%  average patience in Interest-rate frame minus that in Amount frame.
 p 
 .05.  p 
 .001.
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well as with iE and xS), we investigated this possibility further in
Experiment 2 by examining delays of 10 years in addition to 1 and
3 years. In Experiment 3, we increased D further by increasing the
experimental interest rates.
Experiment 2
We undertook to replicate Experiment 1 and examined further
predictions of the DRIFT model. First, we tested our prediction
that framing decisions as potential investments increases patience.
Second, we added an Interest-total frame to those explored in
Experiment 1. As discussed in the introduction, we anticipated that
directing attention to the total interest (R) would reduce the mag-
nitude effect relative to the amount frame.
In summary, we tested the following predictions:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Choices would produce greater pa-
tience under an investment frame than a “neutral” frame.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Relative to the Amount frame, both the
Interest-rate and Interest-total frames would yield a smaller
magnitude effect.
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): Patience would increase with delay in
the Interest-total and Amount frames but would decrease with
delay in the Interest-rate frame.
Finally, based on both the results of Experiment 1 and the logic of
the DRIFT model, we predicted the following:
Hypothesis 2d (H2d): At sufficiently long delays and large
magnitudes, the Amount-frame would induce greater patience
than the Interest-rate frame.
Method
Respondents were 654 members of eLab, of whom 630 com-
pleted the survey; 60% of the completers were female, with a mean
age of 35 years (Mdn  30, SD  11.6), and 61% had a college
degree or higher. Most were employed either full-time (49%) or
part-time (13%), while 19% were students, and 3% were retired.
Each respondent was randomly assigned to one of five framing
conditions. One was the Interest-rate (described as investment)
frame used in Experiment 1:
Interest-rate/Invest: Would you rather receive $700 now or
invest it at a 4% annual Interest-rate for 3 years?
The remaining four conditions comprised a 2 (Investment
frame) 	 2 (Outcome frame) between-subjects design:
Amount/No invest: Would you rather receive $700 now or
receive an additional $88 in 3 years?
Interest-total/No invest: Would you rather receive $700 now
or receive an additional 12% in 3 years?
Amount/Invest: Would you rather receive $700 now or
invest it to receive an additional $88 in 3 years?
Interest-total/Invest: Would you rather receive $700 now or
invest it to receive an additional 12% in 3 years?
Results
Summary. The results, shown in Table 3, support the DRIFT
model. The most notable are summarized below:
1. Framing choices as investments increases patience (H2a).
2. The magnitude effect was much smaller for the two
interest frames than the Amount frame (H2b).
3. For the Amount and Interest-total frames, delay increased
patience; for the Interest-rate frame, delay decreased pa-
tience (H2c).
4. In the Amount frame, patience was increasing in D. As
amounts increased, the framing effects reversed. At short
delays, the Interest-rate frame elicited more patience than
the Amount frame. However, for large amounts and long
delays (i.e., when D was large), the Amount frame elic-
ited more patience (H2d).
Analyses. We first focused on the four conditions that crossed
the outcome and investment frames (the first four rows in Table 3,
the first four “clusters” in Figures 3a, 3b, and 4). Restricting
ourselves to these conditions, we conducted a 2 (Frame: Amount,
Interest-total) 	 2 (Investment: No invest, Invest) 	 2 (Magni-
tude) 	 3 (Delay: 1, 3, 10 years) ANOVA.
Table 3
Mean Percentage of Patient Choices (Larger, Later [LL] Option) in All Conditions of Experiment 2
Invest Frame N
$700 $70K
1 year 3 years 10 years 1 year 3 years 10 years
No Amount 124 16 (26) 13 (22) 24 (29) 47 (37) 45 (36) 55 (36)
Interest-total 127 27 (33) 34 (37) 41 (38) 44 (37) 53 (36) 60 (37)
Yes Amount 127 23 (29) 20 (28) 30 (29) 66 (34) 64 (35) 62 (34)
Interest-total 125 35 (34) 42 (35) 46 (34) 56 (37) 63 (34) 67 (34)
Interest-rate 127 50 (36) 43 (35) 39 (37) 65 (36) 55 (36) 48 (38)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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As predicted (H2a), there was a main effect of Investment frame,
F(1, 500)  18.96, p 
 .0001, p2  .037. The Investment frame
increased patience, although the effect was moderated by Magnitude,
F(1, 500)  5.65, p  .018, p2  .011. This is highlighted by
Figure 4 (first four clusters), which shows that the impact of the
Investment frame is greater for larger rewards (when xS  $70K
rather than $700). Correspondingly, the magnitude effect was greater
for the Investment than No-investment frame. Since investments
typically involve large amounts of money, it is somewhat surprising
that an explicit investment frame is more influential for large amounts
(when we might expect the large amount to automatically trigger
investment thinking) than small ones.
Overall, we obtained a highly significant Magnitude effect, F(1,
500)  522.55, p 
 .0001, p2  .511, though as Figure 2 clearly
Figure 3. (A) Patience in all conditions of Experiment 2 when xS  $700. (B) Patience in all conditions of
Experiment 2 when xS  $70K. Numbers in bars indicate delays. Error bars indicate 1.96 standard errors of
the mean. LL  Larger, Later option.
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reveals, it was significantly greater for the Amount than for the
Interest-total frame: Frame 	 Magnitude interaction, F(1, 500) 
44.71, p 
 .0001, p2  .082. Finally, we observed the predicted
main effect (see H2c) that Delay increased patience, F(2, 499) 
24.25, p 
 .0001, p2  .089. This was further supported by
separate tests, in both the Amount and Interest-total frame, for a
linear trend of patience changing with delay. The linear trend was
highly significant for both frames: Amount, F(1, 249)  12.1, p 
.001, p2  .046; Interest-total, F(1, 250)  37.86, p 
 .001, p2 
.131.
We next focused on the three individual Investment frames (i.e.,
rows and clusters 3–5), to compare the Interest-rate (an investment
frame) with the Amount and Interest-total frames on a “level
playing field.” We conducted a 3 (Frame: Amount, Interest-total,
Interest-rate) 	 2 (Magnitude: $700, $70K) 	 3 (Delay: 1 year, 3
years, 10 years) ANOVA. This revealed a strong main effect of
Magnitude, F(1, 376)  294.7, p 
 .0001, p2  .439, and highly
significant interactions between Frame and Magnitude, F(2,
376) 33.19, p
 .0001, p2  .15, and between Frame and Delay,
F(4, 1008)  17.80, p 
 .0001, p2  .066. The main effect of
Frame was not significant, F(2, 376)  2.86, p  .058, p2  .015.
The Frame 	 Delay interaction revealed that patience increased
with Delay for the Amount and Interest-total frames, but was
decreasing for the Interest-rate frame. A subsequent analysis fo-
cusing only on the Interest-rate frames confirmed a strong linear
trend, F(1, 126)  24.01, p 
 .0001, p2  .161. All three frames
therefore showed highly significant linear trends, but the direction
was upward (increasing patience) for the Amount and Interest-total
frames and was downward (decreasing patience) for the Interest-
rate frame. As predicted by the DRIFT model (H2c), the frequently
reported hyperbolic discounting effect occurs for the Amount
frame (when xS  $700) and Interest-total frame (because features
D and R increase with delay) but not for the Interest-rate frame.
The Frame 	 Magnitude interaction confirmed H2b, with a
much greater Magnitude-difference for the Amount frame (35%)
than for the Interest-total (21%) or Interest-rate (12%) frames (see
Figure 4). Student Newman–Keuls post hoc tests on the
Magnitude-differences revealed (with p 
 .05) that the magnitude
effect was significantly greater in the Amount frame than the
Interest-total frame, and was significantly greater in the Interest-
total frame than the Interest-rate frame.
To test our conjecture that as D increased, average patience
would start off lower in the Amount frame but end up higher,
we conducted a MANOVA comparing the Amount and Interest-
rate frames at all Delay/Magnitude combinations. The
MANOVA was highly significant, F(6, 247)  15.74, p 
 .001,
indicating that the two frames likely differed. Subsequent pair-
wise comparisons showed the predicted effect. When xS 
$700, the Interest-rate condition yields significantly greater
patience than the Amount condition at all delays. When xS 
$70K, however, the situation is partially reversed. For the
1-year delay, the frames did not differ significantly, but for the
3- and 10-year delays, the Amount frame gave rise to more
patience than the Interest-rate frame.
Overview of Experiments 3 and 4
In many real-world contexts, decision makers are exposed to
multiple frames—either concurrently or sequentially. Loans, for
instance, are often described in terms of both the required pay-
ments (corresponding to D) and the corresponding interest rate (I);
at the time of writing, the largest provider of payday loans in the
United Kingdom was offering the opportunity to “Borrow £265
plus interest & fees £45.52 [D]” at a “Representative APR 4214%
[I]” (www.wonga.com). In the United Kingdom, the provision of
Figure 4. Magnitude effect in all conditions of Experiment 2. Numbers in bars indicate magnitude of xS. Error
bars indicate 1.96 standard errors of the mean. LL  Larger, Later option.
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the interest rate (APR, or annual percentage rate) is required by
law.
In Experiments 3 and 4, we investigated the effect of combining
frames. We expected the impact of the four DRIF features to be a
“blending” of their separate effects, with the weights determined
by how a limited pool of attentional capacity is distributed over
outcome features. When frames are combined, therefore, the re-
sultant weights will themselves be a combination of those arising
from the constituent frames. For instance, if one frame directs most
attention to D, while another directs most attention to I, then by
combining them the attention directed to D and I will be interme-
diate between that directed to them in the separate frames.7
An alternative to frame-blending is frame-adding, in which the
combination of frames increases the total amount of attention
directed to the DRIF features (i.e., the sum of the attentional
weights would increase). To illustrate the distinction between
blending and adding, consider two possible response patterns when
a payday loan is described in one or two ways. In blending, the
preference for a loan described in terms of both I and D would be
intermediate between that for a loan described as I or D separately.
In adding, the loan would become successively less attractive as
other payment terms are added, so that patience given an I and D
description would be lower than that for either separate descrip-
tion.
In Experiment 3, we compared a composite of the Amount and
Interest-rate frames to its constituents, and in Experiment 4, we
compared a composite of the Interest-rate and Interest-total frames
to its constituents. The choice tasks were similar to those used in
the prior studies, though we increased the experimental interest
rates to 6%, 12%, and 24%.
Experiment 3
Method
Respondents were 222 members of eLab, of whom 219 com-
pleted the survey. Among these, 55% were female, 63% held at
least a college degree, and the mean age was 37 years (Mdn  31,
SD  12.75). Most were employed either full-time (50%) or
part-time (12%), while 12% were students, and 5% were retired.
Respondents made 18 choices between SS and LL, which varied
by interest rate (6%, 12%, or 24%) delay (1, 3, or 10 years), and
magnitude (xS  $700 or $70K). Question order was randomized.
Each respondent made choices framed in one of the following
three ways:
Amount: Would you prefer to receive $700 now or invest it
for 1 year for an additional $42?
Interest-rate: Would you prefer to receive $700 now or
invest it for 1 year at 6% interest per year?
Composite: Would you prefer to receive $700 now or invest
it for 1 year for an additional $42 (6% interest per year)?
With respect to the two constituent frames, we made the same
predictions as in our first two experiments: (1) the Interest-
rate frame would yield a smaller magnitude effect than the Amount
frame, (2) patience would be increasing with delay for Amount
frame, and (3) patience would be decreasing with delay for the
Interest-rate frame. Most importantly for this study, we predicted
the composite frame would yield intermediate magnitude and
delay effects (Hypothesis 3a [H3a] and Hypothesis 3b [H3b],
respectively). We also revisited the hypothesis that as D becomes
sufficiently large—which occurs with increases in xS or delay—the
Amount frame will eventually yield greater patience than the
Interest-rate frame.
Results
Summary. Table 4 and Figure 5 present proportions of LL
choices for each condition. The most notable results are summa-
rized below:
1. The constituent frames replicated the results of Experi-
ments 1 and 2. The Amount frame produced a greater
magnitude effect than the Interest-rate frame. In the
Interest-rate frame, patience was decreasing in delay at
both magnitudes. In the Amount frame, patience was
increasing for small magnitudes and was constant for
large magnitudes.
2. The composite frame produced magnitude and delay
effects intermediate between those of the constituent
frames (H3a).
3. The Amount frame showed increasing patience, the
Interest-rate frame showed decreasing patience, and the
Composite frame showed constant patience (H3b). In the
Composite frame, people display what is often referred to
as “exponential” discounting, with the same level of
patience at all delays.
4. For choices involving the high value of xS the Amount
frame induced more patience than the Interest-rate frame,
an effect that increased in delay.
Analyses. We conducted a 3 (Frame: Amount, Composite,
Interest) 	 3 (Delay: 1, 3, 10 years) 	 2 (Magnitude: $700, $70K)
ANOVA. There were main effects of Magnitude and Delay. As
usual, the Magnitude effect, F(1, 216)  135.0, p 
 .0001, p2 
.385, was very large. The Delay effect, F(2, 432) 5.22, p .006,
p
2  .024, was that, on average, patience decreased with delay,
with the proportion choosing LL falling from 57% for a 1-year
delay to 52% for a 10-year delay; the linear trend for Delay was
significant, F(1, 216)  7.86, p  .006, p2  .035.
There was no significant main effect of Frame (p  .925), but
Frame did interact strongly with Magnitude and Delay, in the
7 This also allows for lexicographic response to frames, with some
“trumping” others when they are viewed concurrently, if the decision
maker has some reason to judge some frames as more normatively correct
than others. Such trumping was observed in follow-ups to Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1984) “Asian disease” problem, which suggest that the “lives
lost” version dominates the “lives saved” one (e.g., Ku¨hberger, 1995;
Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). Similarly, in their examination of the date/delay
effect, Read et al. (2005) showed that simultaneous presentation of both
date and delay frames led to preferences identical to those exposed only to
the delay frame.
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manner predicted by Hypotheses 3a and 3b. First, the Frame 	
Magnitude interaction, F(2, 216)  9.95, p 
 .0001, p2  .084,
was expected to reflect the following ordering for the magnitude
effect: Amount  Composite  Interest-rate. As can be seen in
Figure 6, this prediction held numerically; the difference in pa-
tience between the large and small rewards was 35% for Amount,
23% for Composite, and 13% for Interest-rate. Student Newman–
Keuls post hoc tests on the Magnitude-differences confirmed each
pairwise comparison was significant at   .05, supporting H3a.
The Frame 	 Delay interaction, F(4, 432)  6.45, p 
 .0001,
p
2  .056, indicated that delay differed between frames. We had
predicted increasing patience for the Amount frame, decreasing
patience for the Interest-rate frame, and something intermediate for
the Composite frame (H3b). Inspection of Figure 5 shows decreas-
ing patience for the Interest-rate frame at both magnitudes, and
increasing patience for the Amount frame when xS  $700, but not
when it is $70K. Separate within-subject contrasts conducted for
each Frame/Magnitude combination, testing for a linear trend for
Delay, revealed linear trends for the $700/Amount condition, F(1,
70)  9.60, p  .003, p2  .121, and the opposite linear trend for
the $700/Interest-rate condition, F(1, 70)  9.60, p  .003, p2 
.147. No trend was significant for the $70K/Amount condition
(F 
 1 for both linear and quadratic trends), but the linear trend
was highly significant for the $70K/Interest-rate condition, F(1,
71)  20.87, p 
 .001, p2  .227, indicating decreasing patience
with delay.
Most importantly, the pattern for the Composite frame lies
between its constituent frames. We tested this by conducting three
separate ANOVAs, one for each possible pairwise comparison,
testing the individual linear Delay by Frame contrasts, which
indicate whether the difference in patience between pairs of frames
changes linearly with delay. In each case, the linear contrast was
significant: Amount compared to Composite, F(1, 144)  5.05,
p  .026, p2  .039; Composite compared to Interest-rate, F(1,
Figure 5. Mean patience in all conditions of Experiment 3. Numbers in bars indicate delays. Error bars indicate
1.96 standard errors of the mean. LL  Larger, Later option.
Table 4
Mean Percentage of Patient Choices (Larger, Later [LL] Option) in All Conditions of Experiments 3 and 4
Experiment Frame N
$700 $70K
1 year 3 years 10 years 1 year 3 years 10 years
3 Amount 74 31 (39) 39 (37) 43 (35) 73 (35) 74 (35) 72 (35)
Composite 72 44 (42) 41 (36) 42 (34) 68 (35) 67 (35) 61 (35)
Interest-rate 73 56 (39) 49 (36) 41 (39) 70 (35) 60 (35) 52 (35)
4 Interest-total 75 54 (38) 59 (39) 63 (38) 70 (35) 76 (34) 72 (37)
Composite 131 55 (39) 58 (38) 55 (37) 64 (38) 66 (35) 64 (37)
Interest-rate 61 59 (38) 54 (38) 52 (40) 68 (33) 62 (35) 55 (41)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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143)  6.93, p  .009, p2  .038; Amount compared to Interest-
rate, F(1, 145)  25.28, p 
 .0001, p2  .146. This provided
support for H3b.
As with Experiments 1 and 2, the impact of D differs qualita-
tively between the Amount and Interest-rate frames. Patience is
increasing in D for the Amount frame, but decreasing in D for the
Interest-rate frame (when D is implicit). As in earlier studies, we
conducted a MANOVA, which showed that patience differs sig-
nificantly between the Amount and Interest-rate frames, F(6,
136)  7.89, p 
 .001. This effect is broken down by means of the
pairwise comparisons reported in Table 2. As in the earlier studies,
the Interest-rate frame induced more patience for small amounts/
small delays, but this framing effect is gradually eliminated and (in
this study, considerably) reversed for large amounts/large delays.
Across all studies, patience increases in D much more rapidly in
the Amount than the Interest-rate frame.
Experiment 4
We next compared the Interest-total and Interest-rate frames to
their composite frame. We expected to replicate one finding from
Experiment 2—that patience would be increasing in delay with the
Interest-total frame, but decreasing in delay with the Interest-rate
frame (Hypothesis 4a [H4a]). Again, we predicted the composite
frame would yield intermediate effects (Hypothesis 4b [H4b]).
Method
Respondents were 278 members of eLab, 265 of whom com-
pleted the survey. The demographics were essentially identical to
those of previous studies: 55% were female, 57% with a college
degree or higher, and the mean age was 34 years (Mdn 30, SD
12.0). Most were employed either full-time (50%) or part-time
(10%), while 14% were students, and 5% were retired.
We used much the same design as Experiment 3, though the
question wording was changed slightly to accommodate the new
frames.
Interest-rate: Would you prefer to receive $700 now or
invest it for 3 years at 6% interest per year?
Interest-total: Would you prefer to receive $700 now or
invest it for 3 years to receive an additional 19%?
Composite: Would you prefer to receive $700 now or invest
it for 3 years to receive an additional 19% (6% interest per
year)?
Results
Summary. Table 4 presents proportion of LL choices for each
condition. The major results are as follows:
1. Patience was increasing in delay for Interest-total frame,
but decreasing in delay for the Interest-rate frame (H4a).
2. The composite frame yielded intermediate results (H4b).
In particular, patience was unaffected by delay (as in
exponential discounting).
3. Though significant, the magnitude effect was much
smaller than that found in the Amount frames from
earlier studies.
Details. We conducted a 3 (Frame: Total, Composite, Rate)	
3 (Delay: 1 year, 3 years, 10 years) 	 2 (Magnitude: $700, $70K)
ANOVA. The Magnitude effect was significant, F(1, 268) 
29.01, p 
 .0001, p2  .10, but much smaller than in Experiments
1–3, which included Amount frames (where p2 ranged from .36 to
.40). The comparatively small magnitude effect in this study did
not differ significantly across frames.
The only remaining significant effect is a Delay 	 Frame
interaction, F(4, 528)  5.72, p 
 .001, p2  .04. As seen in
Figure 7, all conditions have the same level of patience for the
1-year delay. Further delays decrease patience in the Interest-rate
frame, but decrease patience in the Interest-total frame. The Com-
Figure 6. Magnitude effect in all conditions of Experiment 3. Numbers in bars indicate magnitude of xS. Error
bars indicate 1.96 standard errors of the mean. LL  Larger, Later option.
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posite frame yields intermediate effects, as predicted by H3b, with
patience levels unaffected by duration of delay to LL. We con-
ducted a separate ANOVA for each of the three possible pairwise
comparisons, to ascertain whether the difference in patience be-
tween conditions changes linearly with delay. In each case, the
linear contrast was significant: Interest-total compared to Compos-
ite, F(1, 204)  4.30, p  .039, p2  .021; Composite compared
to Interest-rate, F(1, 190)  5.45, p  .021, p2  .021; Interest-
total compared to Interest-rate, F(1, 134)  12.29, p  .001, p2 
.055.
Discussion
We showed that outcome framing affects the size and even
existence of two major intertemporal choice “anomalies”—the
magnitude and delay effects. Moreover, framing effects inter-
acted with the amounts being considered: When the amount of
money being discounted was “small” (xS  $700), frames that
included information about interest (whether in terms of rates or
total interest earned) significantly increased patience relative to
the standard Amount frame; however, for “large” amounts
(xS  $70K), the reverse was true. Finally, describing choices
as investments increased patience across all amounts and de-
lays. In general, the patterns of preference documented in the
standard frame (Amount/No-investment) differed both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively from those observed using alternate
frames.
Our DRIFT model provides a useful framework for making
sense of these results. Consider a decision maker choosing be-
tween three future payments arising from investing xS for time T,
who is told one of the following three things:
D: You will earn $100;
R: You will increase your money by 50% in total;
I: Your money will grow by 10% per year.
Obviously, we would expect choices to be influenced by the
precise values at which these variables are instantiated, even if the
three descriptions were constrained to be normatively equivalent to
each other. Thus, in its simplest form, the DRIFT model is simply
the claim that when respondents consider a feature, their prefer-
ences will be nudged toward those they would express if they
considered only that feature. In our experiments, attention was
strongly manipulated by explicitly specifying one of these features
(along with the xS and T, and, sometimes, F).
Like other constructed preference models (Johnson, Häubl, &
Keinan, 2007; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Shafir, Simonson, &
Tversky, 1993; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006; Weber et al.,
2007), our DRIFT model shares the core idea that the cognitive
and affective systems have potential access to a range of prefer-
ence building blocks, which are differentially evoked by different
contexts. One question our studies raise, but do not answer, is
whether there is a “correct” or canonical way to measure time
preference. We would not assert that any one of our frames elicits
the “true” value of the discount rate, or the form of the discount
function, but would propose that conclusions drawn from studies
using a single method should be interpreted cautiously. When
respondents were exposed to a composite frame, the results fell
between the two constituent frames. Respondents appeared to view
each frame as providing a useful perspective on choice.
Our study is not the only one showing that different intertem-
poral choice frames produce qualitatively different results. For
Figure 7. Mean patience in all conditions of Experiment 4. Numbers in bars indicate delays. Error bars indicate
1.96 standard errors of the mean. LL  Larger, Later option.
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example, though hyperbolic discounting is widely reported as a
“stylized fact” about human behavior, its apparent ubiquity stems
largely from the homogeneity in research designs—typically stud-
ies involving choices between SS and LL options, where SS is
available immediately and the delay to LL is varied, with outcomes
described in terms of Amounts, and delays described in terms of
units of time. When these procedures are modified, the evidence
for hyperbolic discounting becomes much shakier. Indeed, we find
here that the effect is reversed when outcomes are expressed as
interest rates rather than amounts. Likewise, in earlier work (Read
et al., 2005), we found hyperbolic discounting when time was
described as a delay, but not when it was described in terms of
calendar dates. Relatedly, Stewart, Reimers, and Harris (2012)
showed that the shape of the discount function is highly dependent
on the set of questions people are asked, with the height and
curvature of the function increasing the more positively-skewed is
the distribution of delays.
Framing effects give us information about the normative status
of intertemporal choice behavior that cannot easily be obtained
from observing discounting patterns using a single method. Choice
patterns that deviate from the economic model outlined in the
introduction have understandably attracted attention. Yet, the
anomalous patterns are often not as clearly “anomalous” as
claimed. This can be illustrated with the magnitude effect. With
idealized frictionless capital markets it is indeed anomalous to
discount amounts at different rates depending on their magnitude.
But if there are greater proportional costs or risks associated with
managing small amounts of money, the “correct” discount rate for
money will be sensitive to magnitudes. And, indeed, the costs of
present-to-future and future-to-present transactions do not scale up
with transaction magnitude. For instance, the hassle of cashing a
check imposes a fixed cost, which differs relatively little on
whether that check is for $100 or $100,000. Management costs are
a major reason why small loans (including what is called micro-
credit) cost more in interest than do larger loans (e.g., Shankar,
2006; Shreiner, 2000). The magnitude effect may therefore not be
as “anomalous” as advertised. Similar arguments can be made for
other intertemporal choice anomalies, which often look less anom-
alous upon a more complete specification of the economic problem
that decisions maker face.8
Notwithstanding the foregoing appeal to tone down claims of
irrationality, framing effects do undermine the normative status of
discounting models, because economic analysis is intended to
apply to consequences, not descriptions. This general principle of
descriptive invariance has been widely discussed as a fundamen-
tal, if often tacit, requirement for rationality (e.g., Arrow, 1982;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Wakker, 2010). Descriptive invari-
ance is assumed not just in rational choice models, but also in
many psychological models of intertemporal choice, including
Ainslie’s (1975) account of hyperbolic discounting, Loewenstein
and Prelec’s (1992) generalized hyperbolic discounting model,
Scholten and Read’s (2006) interval discounting model, Killeen’s
(2009) additive-utility model, and many others. All these models
assume that preferences between options can be determined by a
specification of what is to be received and when. In this article, we
have described several failures of descriptive invariance, and we
propose DRIFT as a general approach to understanding such
effects.
8 To our knowledge, the sign effect has not been explicitly rationalized
in the context of intertemporal choice, but Read, Frederick, and Airoldi
(2012) have reviewed arguments for the rationality of hyperbolic discount-
ing, and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) have explained the delay/speedup
asymmetry as a consequence of loss aversion. That is a framing effect, but
unlike those described in this article it is a “rationalization” because the
pain from failing to receive an expected outcome may well be objectively
greater than the pleasure from receiving an unexpected outcome of equiv-
alent size.
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